



Murder will Out: Kingship, Kinship and 







This essay reflects on Jenny Wormald’s ground-breaking article, ‘Bloodfeud, Kindred 
and Government in Early Modern Scotland’ (1980),1 which brilliantly analysed fifteenth- 
and sixteenth-century Scotland’s kin-based mechanisms for pacifying feuding, in 
relation to the public legal system. Essentially, the crown would grant a remission to 
the perpetrator of illegal violence, including killing, on condition that assythment 
(compensation) was given to the victim or his kin. It is not only one of the most 
important articles written on Scottish history, but also – through its wider significance – 
probably the most widely cited; and over thirty years later it reads as powerfully as 
ever. 
 Since 1980, work on feuding has multiplied exponentially. Whereas Wormald had 
to cite only a few dozen studies, nowadays well over a thousand could be mentioned; 
and her comment, ‘greater awareness that feud is a complex business has not resolved 
all problems of interpretation’, now seems a masterly understatement. What, indeed, 
makes a ‘feud’? Long-term fighting across generations, or also short-term retaliation? 
Only kin-groups, or also other groupings? Only killing, or also non-mortal injury and/or 
property damage? Are ‘bloodfeud’ and ‘vendetta’ different from ‘feud’, or subsumed 
within it? Jeppe Büchert Netterstrøm’s introduction to a wide-ranging volume examines 
such issues, giving twenty-six pages on ‘definitions and concepts’ before considering 
how to construct ‘a comprehensive history of European feuding’.2 A ‘more flexible’ and 
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‘broader’ definition is preferable, he argues, so that ‘long-standing bloodfeuds between 
Icelandic peasants might then be placed on the same continuum as bloodfeuds between 
Scottish or Friulian aristocrats as well as the feuds between Franconian noblemen that 
were not primarily bloodfeuds’. Meanwhile: 
Edward Muir has tried to place Renaissance Friuli on a spectrum of European 
feuding societies. At the one end … ‘might be medieval England, where royal 
justice stamped out blood feuds earlier than in any other kingdom, and at the 
other modern Albania, where governments have hardly touched the endemic 
tribal feuds in the mountains … Friuli in the Renaissance came closer to the 
Albanian than the English end of the spectrum’. It is [Netterstrøm’s] opinion 
… that an effort to place the feuding societies of medieval and early modern 
Europe on this sort of spectrum may provide a constructive starting point for 
further comparison.3 
That ‘England–Albania spectrum’ is Jenny Wormald’s concept:4 so ‘Bloodfeud, Kindred 
and Government’ now provides a blueprint for taking the subject forward. 
 Presumably this would employ the flexible and broad Scottish concept of feud, as 
defined by the estates in 1598: ‘all feuds are one of these three natures, namely: that 
there is either no slaughter upon neither side, or slaughter upon one side only, or else 
slaughter upon both sides’.5 Thus Scottish ‘feud’ was not necessarily deadly; it included 
un-friendliness or enmity – as when the duke of Rothesay’s council of 1399 promised 
‘loyal counsel … not having eye for feud nor friendship’.6 As for length, Keith Brown’s 
analysis of 365 feuds between 1573 and 1625 shows that 75 per cent were shorter than 
five years,7 and Steve Boardman’s study of late medieval feuding indicates much the 
same.8 Also, though compensation for death went to the victim’s kindred, feuding 
usually involved ‘friends and part-takers’ too.9 
–––––––––––––– 
‘Violence and society in the early medieval West: An introductory survey’, in Guy Halsall (ed.), Violence 
and Society in the Medieval West (Woodbridge, 1998), 1–45. 
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 Wormald’s article, however, is essentially about the pacification of feud – for which 
she drew upon social anthropology, especially Max Gluckman’s 1955 essay ‘Peace in 
the Feud’.10 Gluckman argued that fear of feuding powerfully inhibited its unlimited 
escalation, because as a feud expanded many of the participants came to realise the 
wider threat, especially to their own interests. Consequently, feuds eventually generated 
a strong desire for pacification, pressurising the protagonists into ceasing hostilities 
and agreeing settlements: ‘peace in the feud’. Though not unchallenged,11 this makes 
broad sense. And recently the behaviourist Christopher Boehm has proposed a similar 
argument, highlighting two opposing human instincts: to retaliate – for both affection 
and honour – when a loved one is hurt or killed; but to compromise and pacify if the 
wider group’s interests are threatened.12 However, the consequent ambivalences and 
dilemmas became increasingly problematic as human groupings became bigger and 
more complex, making feud pacification far from straightforward: feuds could ‘involve 
a long series of lethal exchanges’.13 Boehm’s feud seems less peaceful than Gluckman’s. 
 Another, less functionalist, aspect should be added: the ‘holy’. In a study of 
German justice, the legal/cultural historian Wolfgang Schild argues that pre-Christian 
Germanic peoples had ‘a demonic-magic conception of the world’, in which a kin’s 
(mythical) ancestor was a ‘demonically holy’ figure who bequeathed his holiness to his 
collective kindred. Consequently, when a kin member was killed, the ‘rage that led to 
vengeance’ had three reasons: that the kin’s ‘holy power’ was weakened, which only 
revenge could rectify; that tolerating the initial killing meant the kin was cowardly, 
which also stimulated revenge; and that if no vengeance were taken, the dead kinsman 
might return as a ghost to take it himself, and also to punish negligent relatives (as in 
Hamlet).14 Since the sense of ancestral ‘holiness’ is another long-established instinct, 
this adds a significant extra dimension to Boehm’s arguments. 
 However, Boehm’s quasi-Weberian statements that collective pacification operated 
only when ‘strong authority at the political centre’ was absent, and that kingdoms, as 
they emerge, ‘develop sufficient coercive power … that feuds can be coercively sup-
pressed by the leader, rather than merely being arbitrated’,15 might raise eyebrows. Yet, 
as Rees Davies remarked, ‘feud as an organised and recognized institution is largely a 
phenomenon of the stateless society’.16 Collective pacification mechanisms are far older 
than central coercive ones, and form the background against which the latter devel-
 
10
  Max Gluckman, ‘The peace in the feud’, Past and Present 8 (Nov. 1955), 1–14; also in his Custom and 
Conflict in Africa (Oxford, 1955). 
11
  Brown refers to ‘Gluckman’s … sanitised bloodfeud’ (Bloodfeud, 2), while Netterstrøm suggests he 
‘perhaps understat[ed] the violent elements in feuding’ (‘Study of feud’, 9); and see their references to 
post-Gluckman anthropologists. 
12
  Christopher Boehm, ‘The natural history of blood revenge’, in Netterstrøm and Poulsen (eds.), Feud in 
Medieval and Early Modern Europe, 189–203. 
13
  Ibid., 200. 
14
  Wolfgang Schild, ‘Penal law as a phenomenon of the history of ideas’, in Christoph Hinckeldey (ed.), 
Criminal Justice through the Ages (Rothenburg, 1981), 30–45, at pp. 39–42. 
15
  Boehm, ‘Natural history of blood revenge’, 202–3. 
16
  R. R. Davies, ‘The survival of the bloodfeud in medieval Wales’, History 54 (1969), 338–57, at p. 341. 
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oped – as in medieval and early modern Europe, when, as Wormald said about 
Scotland, ‘the question of interaction between public and private [feud-based] justice is 
at its most problematic’.17 Her analysis naturally highlighted ‘the justice of the feud’18 
in relation to the traditional concept of ‘the justice of the state’. But in human history 
feud justice is age-old, whereas state justice is relatively new. Accordingly, since the 
‘new’ is commonly a bigger factor in change than the ‘old’, my reflections are angled 
towards the justice of the state. 
I 
In the first half, these reflections are on the wider context – beginning in modern Saudi 
Arabia. Its legal system applies Islamic shari‘a law, whereby, with deliberate homicide, 
the victim’s head of kin can either impose the death penalty on the perpetrator, or 
remit it and accept diyya (blood-money).19 Thus the justice of the feud still operates – 
which impinged on Western consciousness in 1997 after an Australian nurse, Yvonne 
Gilford, was murdered there.20 Two British colleagues were accused, and confessed in 
prison; one was sentenced to death, the other to 500 lashes. Westerners’ reactions 
were mixed. Some (favouring the death penalty) accepted Saudi justice; but many 
vehemently condemned the judgement because the confessions appeared forced. That 
point was technically irrelevant under the Saudi system, however – and the only way to 
prevent the execution was for Gilford’s brother to accept diyya. He initially refused,21 
but was persuaded to agree, and $1.2 million (c.£750,000) blood-money was paid, 
allegedly by British defence contractors. The execution and the lashes were cancelled, 
and the defendants were released in 1998. 
 The case highlights that fundamental instinct for revenge. Gilford’s mother said 
‘murder the nurses if they murdered my daughter’,22 and her brother’s wife wished  
‘the killers should go through what my sister-in-law went through’.23 This attitude is 
unsurprising: the second quotation is from a newspaper article examining how, across 
the West, ‘the appeal of retribution is increasing, not in the style of the vendetta … but 
along the more limited Biblical lines of an eye for an eye’.24 Thus, in a sense, the state 
 
17
  Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 57. 
18
  Ibid., 56ff. (used 27 times in all); a preferable formulation to Gluckman’s ‘peace in the feud’. 
19
  Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (Cambridge, 2005), 38–53, 142–90. 
20
  Robert J. Meadows, What Price for Blood? (San Francisco, Calif., 2000); C. R. Pennell, ‘Law as a cultural 
symbol: The Gilford murder case and the presentation of Saudi justice’, International Journal of Human 
Rights 10 (2006), 121–42; Hossein Esmaeili and Jeremy Gans, ‘Islamic law across cultural borders: The 
involvement of Western nationals in Saudi murder trials’, Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 28 (1999–2000). The Times Digital Archive also provides a useful account (search for ‘Gilford’ 
+‘Parry’+‘McLaughlan’ between Dec. 1996 and June 1999). 
21
  Though opposing the death penalty, if the defendant were guilty he wanted her punished, preferably by 
a long prison sentence – which was not possible under shari‘a law. 
22
  Pennell, ‘Law as a cultural symbol’, 135, citing Daily Mail, 23 Aug. 1997. 
23
  Jack O’Sullivan, ‘Wanted: but dead or alive?’, Independent, 4 June 1997: <http://www.independent.co.uk 
/news/1254029.html>, accessed 1 June 2013). 
24
  Ibid.: highlighting the USA’s ‘Federal Victims and Witness Protection Act’, 1982, by which increasingly 
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has replaced the kin-group as the agency of retributive punishment (often too lenient 
for victims’ families). However, in Saudi Arabia the prosecutor is the victim’s head of 
kin, not a state official. Also, though judges determine whether the accusation is valid, 
if it is, the accuser determines the accused’s fate: diyya or death. That kindred role is 
typical of feud justice, but the state is not excluded: it is there in an enabling capacity, 
and has one executive function, for if diyya is refused, a public executioner carries out 
the death sentence.25 So the state could be seen as employing and maintaining the justice 
of the feud, under shari‘a law; there is no conflict between ‘state’ and ‘feud’ justice. 
 Now, shari‘a law derives from the Qur’an (seventh century) and Hadiths (‘tradi-
tions’; ninth century), as interpreted by scholars over subsequent centuries, and the 
continuities are strong in Saudi Arabia.26 Diyya originates in one passage in the Qur’an 
enjoining compassion instead of eye-for-eye retaliation, and another in the Hadiths 
indicating that a man’s blood-money should be 100 camels.27 That is still the Saudi 
Arabian benchmark – and in 2011 diyya for deliberate homicide was raised from 
110,000 ryals to 400,000 (c.£70,000) because of inflation in camel prices.28 Saudi 
blood-money, therefore, represents more than a millennium of continuity – back to the 
era of Anglo-Saxon wergeld and Gaelic cró.29 The standard view is that diyya was 
introduced to limit feuding: ‘with the advent of Islam, this institution of revenge was 
drastically modified’.30 That probably exaggerates, because the concept is pre-Islamic;31 
but shari‘a law did institutionalise it,32 producing a process that can be regarded as 
having been brought about by the earthly rulers (Muhammad and subsequent caliphs) 
of a theocratic state, who by incorporating ‘peace in the feud’ within Islam also 
harnessed the sense of the ‘holy’. Thus we can see the justice of the state impacting on 
that of the feud during the early Middle Ages, in a way that operated throughout the 
Islamic world and still does in Saudi Arabia – which, in terms of Wormald’s spectrum, 
is surely right in the middle. 
 We now shift to Europe, initially the Balkans. Albania is on the spectrum’s edge: 
the horrific feuding that still occurs there ‘is not about order and stability [but] about 
–––––––––––––– 
frequent ‘victim impact statements’, generally demanding a retaliatory death penalty, are presented to 
the court after an accused is found guilty (note that in the UK such statements do not influence sen-
tencing).  
25
  Peters, Crime and Punishment, 30–2, 36–7; in the Gilford case this received great press attention. 
26
  Ibid., 6–68, 148–53. 
27
  Qur’an, 5.45; Hadith Sahi-al-Bukhai, 9.83.36. For early diyya, Lahcen Daaït, ‘Le prix du sang (diya) au 
premier siècle de l’Islam’, Hypothèses (2006/1), 329–42. 
28
  Arab News, 10 Feb. 2010 and 6 Sept. 2011: <http://www.arabnews.com/node/336788 and …/390060>, 
accessed 1 June 2013. That is for killing a Muslim male; for a female Muslim, or a Christian of either 
gender, it is only half. 
29
  With payments in livestock, the animals bred and thus provided lasting income. As a Saudi economist 
stressed, diyya in camels was a long-term investment for the deceased’s dependants; but SR400,000 
would be spent before a victim’s children reached maturity: Arab News, 25 Sept. 2011: <http://www 
.arabnews.com/node/392359>, accessed 1 June 2013. 
30
  Peters, Crime and Punishment, 40. 
31
  Daaït, ‘Le prix du sang’, 331–2. 
32
  See ibid., 332. 
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honour’, and there is ‘no government impact’.33 That also applied to neighbouring 
Montenegro and Kosovo until the twentieth century. However, feuding was mostly 
limited to their mutual mountainous borderlands, which from the fifteenth century 
harboured opponents of Ottoman conquest who in ‘state’ terms were outlaws.34 These 
operated their own feud justice, following a law-code (Kanun) attributed to the anti-
Ottoman leader Lekë Dukagjini (1410-81), which ‘became a major symbol of Albanian 
identity’ and still operates nowadays.35 Though it included blood-money, that was 
commonly rejected as dishonourable, and the provisions for Mosaic life-for-life 
vengeance were preferred and exalted – presumably reflecting hostility to Islam, 
though aspects of the ‘holy’ also come to mind. Consequently, the factors which for 
Gluckman and Boehm militate against extensive, enduring feuding did not operate 
effectively. In the stateless Albanian, Montenegrin and Kosovan highlands, there was 
(and in Albania still is) little ‘peace in the feud’. 
 The Balkans were hardly typical, however. What of the heart of Europe, the once 
Germanic/Frankish territories? Germanic feuding and blood-money were famously 
described by Tacitus,36 and analysed almost as famously by J. M. Wallace-Hadrill in 
his ‘Bloodfeud of the Franks’, which applied Gluckman’s concept to history for the first 
time.37 Moreover, in 789 Charlemagne prohibited all killings including those of 
vengeance – ‘the earliest piece of legislation against feud’38 – and added in 802 that if 
killing did happen, compensation must be immediately offered and accepted; royal 
officers maintained both laws.39 In the Carolingian Empire as in the Islamic, the state 
was becoming involved in feud justice. 
 After the Carolingian Empire collapsed, the parallel was not sustained, especially 
in what became the German empire. Here, roughly speaking, there were three basic 
trends: at the top, central authority faded as imperial dynasties came and went; at the 
 
33
  Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 56–7. From the later 1960s, tough action by the Communist regime greatly 
reduced bloodfeud, but it has re-emerged significantly since 1991: Mentor Mustafa and Antonia Young, 
‘Feud narratives: Contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’, Anthropo-
logical Notebooks 14 (2008), 87–197, at pp. 88–90; Tanya Mangalakova, The Kanun in present-day 
Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro (Sofia, 2004: <http://www.imir-bg.org/imir/reports/The_Kanun 
.pdf>), 3. For Albanian bloodfeud in general, Margaret Hasluck, The Unwritten Law in Albania 
(Cambridge, 1954), 219–60. 
34
  Mustafa and Young, ‘Feud narratives’, 87–9; Christopher Boehm, Blood Revenge: The Enactment and 
Management of Conflict in Montenegro and other Tribal Societies (2nd edn., Philadelphia, Pa., 1986), 
41–5. 
35
  Mangalakova, Kanun in Albania, 2–3. 
36
  ‘It is an obligation to take over the father’s or kinsman’s feuds (inimicitias) and friendships (amicitias). 
But feuds do not go on with no reconciliation. In fact, even homicide can be atoned for with a fixed 
number of cattle or sheep. The whole family receives this compensation. This is an advantage for the 
community, since feuds are dangerous where freedom exists’. Tacitus, Germania, c. 21: from Tacitus, 
Agricola and Germany, ed. and trans. Anthony R. Birley (Oxford, 1999), 48. 
37
  First published in Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 41 (1959), 459–87; reprinted in J. M. Wallace-
Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings (London, 1962). 
38
  J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, Early Germanic Kingship in England and on the Continent (Oxford, 1971), 107–8. 
39
  Admonitio Generalis, 789, c. 67; Capitulary (at Aachen), 802, c. 32. English versions in P. D. King 
(trans.), Charlemagne: Translated Sources (Lambrigg, 1987), 216, 240–1. 
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middle, regional duchies and counties achieved semi-independence, but often frag-
mented through accidents of inheritance; and at the lower, an expanding knightly class 
became increasingly prominent.40 South and south-west Germany finished up as a 
‘geopolitically highly fragmented area, with … puny territorial states [and a] kaleido-
scopic jumble of ill-defined, intermingled and competing jurisdictions’;41 and it was not 
much better elsewhere. General law-codes existed, especially the Sachsenspiegel (from 
the thirteenth century),42 but little direct overall authority. The emperors did get lords 
to make regional peace-agreements (Landfrieden), which generally broke down; and 
princely hostility thwarted Frederick III’s empire-wide Landfried of 1465.43 In practice, 
the intermingled jurisdictions made legal dispute-settling virtually impossible: ‘each 
party to a dispute always claimed to have justice on its side, whereas no single supreme 
institution existed which bindingly defined the law’.44 That puts Germany fairly close 
to Albania on Wormald’s spectrum – and of course stimulated feuding. 
 German feud research, however, has taken a Sonderweg.45 Since 1939, Otto 
Brunner’s Land und Herrschaft has been fundamental;46 but that was little known 
elsewhere until the English translation, ‘Land’ and Lordship, appeared in 1992,47 
possibly because of its difficult German,48 but also possibly because Brunner, an 
enthusiastic National Socialist,49 said it studied the ‘political concepts of the Third 
Reich’.50 However, as Benjamin Arnold commented, ‘it would be hard to detect that his 
scholarly exposition … [has] been tainted by false notions about the historical driving 
forces of Volk and Führung’.51 We may never know; but Brunner’s arguments set the 
 
40
 What follows derives from F. R. H. du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1983), 
chapters 2–4; John Watts, The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500 (Cambridge, 2009), 59–66, 
188–91, 301–7, 352–5; Benjamin Arnold, Princes and Territories in Medieval Germany (Cambridge, 
1991); and Tom Scott, ‘Germany and the Empire’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. VII, 
c.1415–c.1500 (Cambridge, 1998), 337–66. 
41
  Hillay Zmora, The Feud in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 2011), 49. 
42
  The Saxon Mirror: A Sachsenspiegel of the Fourteenth Century, trans. Maria Dobozy (Philadelphia, 
Pa., 1999). 
43
  Du Boulay, Germany, 76–3; Scott, ‘Germany and the Empire’, 358–9; Watts, Making of Polities, 62, 
101–2, 190, 303, 354; and F. R. H. du Boulay, ‘Law enforcement in medieval Germany’, History 63 
(1978), 345–55. 
44
  Zmora, Feud, 40. 
45
  Netterstrøm, ‘Study of feud’, 20–8 (on ‘The Sonderweg of German feud research’). 
46
  Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Südostdeutschlands im 
Mittelalter (Vienna, 1939). 
47
  ‘Land’ and Lordship: Structures of Government in Medieval Austria, trans. Howard Kaminsky and 
James Van Horn Melton (Philadelphia, 1992); translating the fourth, heavily revised, edition (Vienna, 
1959), in which Österreichs replaced Südostdeutschlands in the title. 
48
  Ibid., p. xiii. 
49
  Peter N. Miller, ‘Nazis and Neo-Stoics: Otto Brunner and Gerhard Oestreich before and after the 
Second World War’, Past and Present 176 (Aug. 2002), 144–86, at p. 157: in 1943 ‘the officer to whom 
Brunner reported’ was SS-Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the Reich’s Security Ser-
vice. 
50
  Brunner, Land und Herrschaft (1st edn.), 512; cited by Miller, 155. 
51
  Benjamin Arnold, ‘Structures of medieval government and the thought-world of Otto Brunner (1898–
1982)’, Reading Medieval Studies 20 (1994), 3–12, at p. 9. But Miller, ‘Nazis and Neo-Stoics’, stresses 
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agenda for the German-speaking world, and are crucial here. 
 Brunner rejected state-oriented history, employing a bottom-up approach to show 
what was really going on. He focused on Austria’s districts and provinces, to which he 
applied the term Land. This was not just territorial: 
Land was a legal idea … nearer to ‘district’ in one of its original senses as a 
juridical dimension in which, in the medieval milieu, all rights, authority, and 
law added up to a shared endeavour partly to do with administering the law 
courts, partly to do with the defence of the land, and partly allowing for self-
defence within the land.52 
It is the territory of Landfrieden, and not unlike the English county community. 
Brunner derived it from the Germanic past, when ‘Civitas, tribe and Land were 
associations of arms-bearing men … able to fight for their rights’.53 Such fighting could 
be done either in a court, or if (as was often the case) that was unsatisfactory, through 
force of arms – in other words feud, which ‘was as integral to medieval political life as 
war is to the modern state’.54 
 But Brunner’s feud was purely ‘knightly’, and excluded bloodfeud: 
The Middle Ages distinguished … between blood vengeance, that is, mortal 
enmity, and the knightly feud with its ‘challenge’. The former could be 
employed by anyone … On the other hand the knightly feud was reserved to 
the nobility and seigneurial proprietors of similar status … The knightly feud 
could be employed to settle any conflict, so that even the most trivial legal 
dispute could serve as an excuse for declaring a feud.55 
This ‘knightly feud’ did not involve vengeance, and was legitimate if formally declared 
– as confirmed by Charles IV’s ‘Golden Bull’ of 1356, which prohibited attacks ‘under 
the pretext of a feud, with arson, robbery or plunder, unless the feud has been 
announced publicly … three days in advance’.56 The legitimation, however, did not 
apply to killing, and while ‘the killing of one’s opponent’ and ‘honest homicide’ are 
recorded ‘often enough’, 
–––––––––––––– 
that the removal of Nazi concepts from the 1959 edition obscures the argument (p. 154); that in 1939 
Brunner declared, ‘Not the state, nor culture, are for us today the object of history, but rather Volk and 
Reich’ (p. 155); and that ‘Fernand Braudel was right to be suspicious of Brunner’s motives’ (p. 158; 
Land und Herrschaft has never been translated into French). 
52
  Arnold, ‘Structures of medieval government’, 4–5. Because Brunner used Land in a technical sense, 
inverted commas are used in citations of the English title. 
53
  Brunner, ‘Land’ and Lordship, 17. 
54
  Ibid., 90. 
55
  Ibid., 16. 
56
  Quoted in Zmora, Feud, 34, in the context of Baron Georg von Puchheim’s 1453 letter to Emperor 
Frederick III telling him, ‘I want to be enemy of Your Grace’s land and people, and wherever I encoun-
ter your servitors and subjects, I will cause them damage’. 
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in knightly feuds the killing of one’s opponents was something rather to be 
avoided. For one thing, it was not exempt from the vengeance of the victim’s 
friends and relatives – that is, from blood vengeance and blood feud. And for 
another, even though it was legally recognised as long as ‘enmity’ existed 
between the parties, it nevertheless went against the purpose of the feud, 
which was to rectify an injustice, not to destroy the other party.57 
Killing in ‘knightly feud’ broke the rules, and the killer’s peers would turn against him 
– making it counter-productive. But otherwise feuding had a very wide scope. ‘Injus-
tice’ was any slight to knightly (and hence aristocratic) honour; and any member of the 
knightly class could declare feud against any other, even a territorial prince or the 
emperor.58 
 The commonest quarrels, however, were among those in frequent contact, and the 
typical feud occurred within a Land. The aim was to make an opponent redress the 
‘injustice’ by damaging his lordly and economic status through attacks on his depend-
ent peasantry. Thus the peasants were ‘most affected by feuds … the loss of harvest, 
cattle, clothing, and household furnishings was bad enough, while the burning down of 
whole villages caused losses that were irreparable’59 – and peasants were often killed. 
But that was how the world worked: ‘feud [was] an evil, but one as unavoidable as crop 
failures and famine’.60 The affected peasantry had either to suffer or to abandon their 
lords – the purpose of the exercise – and fatalities were simply collateral damage. 
 ‘Land’ and Lordship ‘has become a veritable battleground’,61 and consequently 
‘German historiography exceeds by far any other national historiography as to the 
quantity of feud studies produced’62 – all broadly within Brunner’s conceptual frame-
work, as Hillay Zmora’s recent overview demonstrates.63 Zmora himself develops the 
analysis significantly. One instance is his concept of ‘inimical intimacy’:64 Brunner 
located feuding within the Land, but for Zmora it is even more local. Feuds mostly 
derive from neighbourly friction – and those who fail to counter a neighbour’s hostility 
are despised by others. Hence Zmora stresses proximity more than honour. Also, most 
importantly, he brings in a higher political level, highlighting rivalries and conflicts 
among the German princes – who used, manipulated and stimulated knightly hostilities 
to gain advantages against their own princely rivals. This gives a top-down dimension 
to German feuding after all, and leads Zmora to connect it with ‘state-building’, albeit 
at the princely rather than the imperial level.65 
 
57
  Brunner, ‘Land’ and Lordship, 68. 
58
  As in note 56, above. 
59
  Brunner, ‘Land’ and Lordship, 88–9. 
60
  Ibid., 91, quoting a tenth-century text. 
61
  Zmora, Feud, 9. 
62
  Netterstrøm, ‘Study of feud’, 22. 
63
  Zmora, Feud, 1–28. 
64
  Ibid., 50 ff., 77 ff. 
65
  Ibid., chapters 5–6, based largely on Franconia, his own research area, rather than Brunner’s Austria; 
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 Zmora’s insights are fascinating, with European, not just German, relevance; yet 
his work is still within Brunner’s ‘knightly feud’ parameters. That is a general point: as 
Netterstrøm chides, the ‘self-sufficiency of feud studies probably explains why German 
feud research has neither significantly obtained the foreign anthropological and 
historical literature on feud nor compared the German feud system to the feuding 
societies of, say, Icelandic peasants or Scottish aristocrats’.66 Comparisons with Scot-
land are certainly instructive. Two immediate thoughts are that Scottish feuding often 
had ‘no slaughter upon neither side’;67 but that German knightly quarrels could involve 
killing, and even (as Brunner admitted) bloodfeud: 
Killing for revenge … was something quite different … The murderer was 
peaceless vis-à-vis the friends and relatives of his victim, and could therefore 
be killed out of hand unless an atonement intervened … Even among the 
nobility and others who had the right to feud, and whose feuds were mostly of 
the ordinary sort, the blood feud was not unknown.68 
Thus it is not that late medieval German elites did not have bloodfeuds; it is that 
(because of Brunner’s approach) these appear not to have received in-depth study. Yet 
the Sachsenspiegel lawcode that was followed for centuries treated wergeld, a major 
concomitant of bloodfeud, as current;69 and actual wergeld payments by killers are 
recorded in seventeenth-century Holstein.70 Surely, therefore, compensation for both 
‘honest homicide’ in knightly feuds and killings in bloodfeud was required – which 
suggests German parallels with all types of Scottish feuding. 
 As for the anthropological issue, ‘peace in the feud’ existed in early medieval 
Germany, upheld by central power; but when central power diminished, we might 
expect feuding to have intensified. However, if most significant quarrels occurred 
within coherent group structures (Brunner’s Land, Zmora’s neighbourhood), then, in 
the absence of effective external authority, group pressures to avoid or settle feuding 
would no doubt have increased, as would individual and collective fears of its 
disastrous effect. The collective group response would presumably have been to create 
a means of settling elite disputes honourably but with the least possible violence – as 
Brunner implicitly argued.71 That is surely what the knightly feud was about: letting 
landowning neighbours quarrel dramatically and satisfactorily, without threatening 
–––––––––––––– 
also Hillay Zmora, State and Nobility in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 1997). 
66
  Netterstrøm, ‘Study of feud’, 22–3. 
67
  Above, at note 5. Two examples are the Angus–Dalkeith feud in 1399 and the Hepburn–Hume one in 
the mid-1440s: Michael Brown, The Black Douglases: War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland, 
1300–1455 (East Linton, 1998), 88–91, 94; Armstrong, ‘Fyre of ire kyndild’, 64–72. 
68
  Brunner, ‘Land’ and Lordship, 68. 
69
  Dobozy (trans.), Saxon Mirror, 20–4, and ad indicem. 
70
  Bertha S. Phillpotts, Kindred and Clan in the Middle Ages and After (Cambridge, 1913), 125–46, esp. 
pp. 138–9. Holstein is the only part of the Empire included in Phillpotts’s book. 
71
  Brunner, ‘Land’ and Lordship, 68. 
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each other’s death. So, while honour could be ostentatiously upheld, the factors that 
made feud so fearsome were removed. I suggest, therefore, that in later medieval 
Germany the ‘bloodfeud of the Franks’ was ‘sanitised’ or emasculated,72 allowing elites 
to indulge in frequent non-mortal, honourable and legitimate conflicts – in which 
ordinary people suffered most. 
 Meanwhile, what was going on in the western remnant of the Frankish Empire, 
namely France? Much the same, according to Howard Kaminsky.73 A translator  
of Land und Herrschaft, he also dismisses state-focused history as anachronistic, 
focuses on Land-like ‘modules of lordship’, emphasises ‘the noble feud’, and argues 
that it was fundamental: ‘just as one cannot imagine the modern state tolerating a right 
to feud, so we cannot imagine the medieval state without it’.74 Yet while in principle 
noble/knightly feud (‘guerre privée’, or private warfare, in French terminology) might 
have been the same in France and Germany,75 royal power was not. It grew signifi-
cantly in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century France, and though there were huge 
political crises later, the basis of French crown authority survived and royal power was 
reconstructed. But, as Graeme Small stresses, ‘the picture … is necessarily more  
complex than the roller-coaster, single-track story of the monarchy’s “progress”’. We 
should think instead of a ‘plurality of powers … and consider the interactions between 
them: kings and princes, of course, but also nobles, churchmen, municipal authorities 
and peasant communities’.76 Much of the royal–noble interaction involves the noble 
feud, which ‘continued in France throughout [and beyond] the later Middle Ages’;77 
and here I consider the crown, or state, response. 
 From Louis IX (1214–70) to Charles V (1364–80), some thirty ordinances 
prohibiting private warfare were issued, to little general effect;78 in southern France 
 
72
  ‘Yet despite the apparent rule of force, a feature of the German Fehde was the frequent weakness of 
those who pursued it’: Du Boulay, ‘Law enforcement in medieval Germany’, 346. 
73
  Howard Kaminsky, ‘The noble feud in the later Middle Ages’, Past and Present 177 (Nov. 2002), 55–83. 
74
  Ibid., 57–8. 
75
  Except that accounts of French private war show that there was no bar to killing; and see Justine 
Firnhaber-Baker’s explanation of why she prefers ‘war’ to ‘feud: ‘Jura in Medio: The settlement of 
seigneurial disputes in later medieval Languedoc’, French History 26 (2012), 441–59, at pp. 445–6. 
76
  Graeme Small, Late Medieval France (Basingstoke, 2009), 3; from Lewis’s phrase, ‘the pluralistic 
nature of power distribution’: P. S. Lewis, ‘Reflections on the role of royal clientèles in the construction 
of the French monarchy’, in N. Bulst et al. (eds.), L’état ou le roi (Paris, 1996), 51–68, at p. 55. The 
‘plurality of powers’ is a recurrent theme in Small’s discussion of the political aspects of late medieval 
French history. See also David Potter (ed.), France in the Later Middle Ages, 1200–1500 (Oxford, 
2003), and the chapters on France in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. VI, c.1300–c.1415 
(Cambridge, 2000), and vol. VII, c.1415–c.1500 (Cambridge, 1998). 
77
  Kaminsky, ‘Noble feud’, 40. See, e.g., Robin Harris, Valois Guyenne (Woodbridge, 1994), 137–42; Stuart 
Carroll, ‘The peace in the feud in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France’, Past and Present 178 
(Feb. 2003), 74–115; and Stuart Carroll, Blood and Violence in Early Modern France (Oxford, 2006), 
which has valuable material on the fifteenth century in the introduction and first chapter. 
78
  Most prohibited it during times of international war, but at least one per reign banned it altogether: 
Justine Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Seigneurial war and royal power in later medieval southern France’, Past and 
Present 208 (Aug. 2010), 37–76, at pp. 51–3; and, more generally, Raymond Cazelles, ‘La réglementa-
tion royale de la guerre privée de Saint Louis à Charles V et la précarité des ordonnances’, Revue 
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‘local wars were just as common … as in the feud-friendly Empire’.79 Yet the ordinances 
did at least assert royal antipathy to private warfare. Also, both Richard Kaeuper and 
Justine Firnhaber-Baker show that while they did not prevent that from breaking out, 
once it happened individuals could be prosecuted for breaching them.80 But the 
‘plurality of powers’ also applied: noble claims to a right to private warfare had  
considerable effect,81 and so such prosecutions succeeded only in areas under direct 
royal jurisdiction.82 
 However, from Philip IV’s reign (1285–1314) other strategies were employed. 
First, ‘interaction between royal and noble powers’ was utilised: ‘royal officials allowed 
and indeed themselves engaged in a range of extra- and quasi-judicial negotiations 
with warmakers’, especially by acting as high-status honest brokers to persuade 
warring parties to compromise and make peace.83 Second, a direct means of respond-
ing to feuding anywhere, irrespective of jurisdictions, was developed: that of bringing 
one of the parties into the king’s special peace.84 To attack someone within that peace 
was tantamount to attacking the king himself – always illegal no matter where the 
offender lived. This nullified the plurality of powers, since everyone in the kingdom 
was the king’s subject. Providing ‘safeguards’ for threatened individuals, therefore, 
helped combat private warfare. It was not infallible: a safeguard might be obtained by 
the aggressor, or by both sides, or could be ignored – though that was risky.85 Safe-
guards were simply based on the king’s age-old right to protect his friends;86 but 
through that traditional power, French crown authority extended into the world of the 
feud. 
 Third, that also happened via letters of remission granting royal pardons, which 
survive from 1304 on. Though these were criticised both then and now ‘for allowing 
thieves and murderers to escape with impunity’,87 Claude Gauvard’s magisterial analysis 
of 7,500 of the remissions that the royal chancery issued throughout the kingdom 
between 1364 and 1515 paints a very different picture.88 They went to all social classes, 
–––––––––––––– 
historique de droit français et étranger, 4th ser., 38 (1960), 530–48. 
79
  Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Seigneurial war’, 46; also Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Jura in Medio’, 444–7. 
80
  Richard W. Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages 
(Oxford, 1988), 239–60; Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Seigneurial war’, 51–7 (superseding Cazelles’s and Kamin-
sky’s interpretation); Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Jura in Medio’, 447–9. 
81
  Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Seigneurial war’, 55. 
82
  Ibid., 63–7. 
83
  Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Jura in Medio’, 450–5 (quotation from p. 451). 
84
  Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Seigneurial war’, 69–74; also Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order, 235–60. 
85
  As illustrated by the execution of the early fourteenth-century Gascon lord Jourdain de l’Isle. See the 
very different accounts in Kaminsky, ‘Noble feud’, 69, and Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order, 
226; plus Joseph Kicklighter’s fascinating full-scale study, ‘The nobility of English Gascony: The case of 
Jourdain de l’Isle’, Journal of Medieval History 13 (1987), 327–42. 
86
  Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Seigneurial war’, 70–1. 
87
  Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Jura in Medio’, 457. 
88
  Claude Gauvard, ‘De grâce especial’: Crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Âge (1991; 2nd, 
1-volume, edn., Paris, 2010), esp. 703–806, 896–952. For a brief version of the most striking part of 
her argument, see Claude Gauvard, ‘Grâce et exécution capitale’, Bibliothéque de l’École des chartes, 
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though nobles are over-represented proportionally. Fifty-seven per cent involved 
homicides, of which the vast majority (85 per cent) were acts of vengeance – but only 
about a third were triggered by previous killing, while two-thirds avenged oral or 
physical insults.89 Thus, while l’honneur blessé was a crucial motive, life-for-life 
killing was not prevalent. Gauvard attributes that to the letters of remission,90 arguing 
that a predominant sense of honour fostered wide tolerance of violent responses to 
insults, but that after the initial hot-blooded action the priority was to prevent further 
killing: hence the remissions.91 And being acts of royal grace and mercy outside and 
above formal legal processes,92 they, like safeguards, were available to anyone 
irrespective of jurisdictional technicalities. 
 But what of the dead victim’s kin, who would want their own revenge? Because 
remission letters narrate the offender’s story, Gauvard’s analysis is almost entirely 
from that standpoint. However, one brief passage shifts the focus: 
Whatever the process adopted for restoring the peace, an accord was always 
necessary in order for the king to be able to legitimately grant his remission. 
The clause that limited royal grace, the only one that might be formulated, 
provided that ‘satisfaction is to be made to the party if not [already] made’. It 
is present in 90% of the letters: it is therefore a clause that could not be got 
round.93 
The procedure for bestowing royal grace is also important.94 A killer seeking remission 
had to obtain chancery authorisation, get his letter properly written, submit it for royal 
approval, pay a fee – and then present it to the relevant local court, where its accuracy 
would be investigated, ideally before his victim’s kin, who could challenge it and 
demand damages. Only then, if all went well, would the letter be formally ratified. The 
court hearing was vital, but it judged not the killer himself but the narrative in his 
letter and, especially, the satisfaction of his victim’s kin – to assure the king that his 
exercise of royal grace was deserved. This is the most significant way whereby the late 
medieval French crown came, by extra-judicial means, to exert state authority over the  
 
–––––––––––––– 
153 (1995), 275–90. The 7,500 remissions consist of all 3,752 issued between 1380 and 1424 plus a full 
sample of the rest. 
89
  Gauvard, ‘De grâce especial’, 242 (table 8), 756 (table 41; my extrapolation), and in general chapter 16 
(‘L’honneur blessé’). 
90
  Ibid., within chapters 17 (‘La Vengeance’), 18(2) (‘Meutres et homicides’), and 20 (‘Pardonner et 
punir’); esp. 778–9, 797–9, 940–4. 
91
  Best summed up in Gauvard, ‘Grâce et exécution capitale’, 218: ‘the royal chancery had every facility to 
grant the remission – a remission which stops vengeance and precipitates accord between the parties’. 
92
  Ibid., 277–80, and Gauvard, ‘De grâce especial’, 907–20 (‘Justice et miséricord). 
93
  Gauvard, ‘De grâce especial’, 778: ‘satisfaccion soit faicte a partie si faite n’est’. 
94
  Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century 
France (Cambridge, 1988), 8–14; also Carroll, ‘Peace in the feud’, 106–8, and Carroll, Blood and Vio-
lence, 214–21. 
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feud-settlement process – though actual feuding still continued during the early 
modern era. 
 Thus, while France and Germany had common roots, the late medieval contrast is 
striking. Admittedly, that might be due partly to different approaches: if a German 
study included peasant quarrels and killings, or if a French one dealt only with the 
knightly classes, it might be less.95 Nevertheless, the role of the crown was crucial: the 
French kings found ways of bypassing jurisdictional problems; the German emperors 
did not; nor, yet, did the princes (who did not possess ‘royal grace’). As for Wormald’s 
spectrum, France can be placed well within the English side – while the relevance of 
French procedures, especially letters of remission, for any commentary on her 
‘Bloodfeud’ is patently obvious. 
 We now cross to England, where, to quote Wormald,  
before the Norman Conquest public authority had already taken over at least 
part of the responsibilities of the kin, and where within two centuries after it 
the bloodfeud itself had been replaced by a concept of crime enshrined in a 
uniquely comprehensive system of royal justice.96 
Her summing-up is still valid, though nuanced by recent work. In particular, Paul 
Hyams’s Rancor and Reconciliation softens the distinction between earlier kin-based 
and later crown-based justice.97 Hyams shows that once the latter became predominant 
(in the thirteenth century), state agency provided an effective and safe way of gaining 
revenge on an opponent – by getting him condemned either to death, or more commonly 
to outlawry for fleeing trial (so anyone could kill him). Many of Hyams’s ‘case 
narratives’ illustrate how English royal justice became an instrument of feud: if you 
seek revenge and can manipulate the judicial system (or have it manipulated), that 
becomes a powerful weapon.98 
 The more complex the system, the more it could be manipulated – as in four-
teenth- and fifteenth-century England, where numerous conflicts among the landed 
classes led Kaminsky to apply his concept of ‘noble feud’ there as well as to France. 
 
95
  Since over 90% of Gauvard’s letters related to non-nobles, the conclusions from these will obscure any 
noble-specific points. That said, Carroll’s analysis in Blood and Violence, which focuses much more on 
nobles, does not contradict Gauvard’s. 
96
  Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 57. 
97
  Paul L. Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England (Ithaca, NY, 2003); also T. B. Lambert, 
‘Theft, homicide and crime in late Anglo-Saxon Law’, Past and Present 214 (Feb. 2012), 3–43; John G. 
H. Hudson, ‘Feud, vengeance and violence in England from the tenth to the twelfth centuries’, in Belle 
S. Tuten and Tracey L. Billado (eds.), Feud, Violence and Practice: Essays in Medieval Studies in Honor 
of Stephen D. White (Farnham, 2010), 29–54; Richard L. Keyser, ‘“Agreement supersedes law, and love 
judgement”: Legal flexibility and amicable settlement in Anglo-Norman England’, Law and History 
Review 30 (2012), 37–88; Daniel Klerman, ‘Settlement and the decline of private prosecution in 
thirteenth-century England, Law and History Review 19 (2001), 1–65. 
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  Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation, 242–308; and see Brown, Bloodfeud, 44: ‘in a feuding society … 
the law was simply seen as a weapon with a cutting edge of its own for pursuing violence’. 
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Despite errors, he has a point:99 English noble and gentry feuding seems to have 
become more frequent, particularly in the fifteenth century.100 Gerald Harriss provides 
the best explanation.101 Most feuding originated in land disputes, which became 
common because England’s increasingly complex land laws not only stimulated claims 
and counter-claims but also made victory in court near-impossible to achieve.102 
Instead, disputants used simpler actions of trespass and breach of the peace, hoping to 
pressurise opponents into out-of-court settlements. And both sides generally obtained 
support from their lords; so great men were sucked into gentry disputes. Ideally, 
compromises would be arranged, with reparations where necessary.103 Unfortunately, 
such arbitrated settlements were not absolutely binding, and were often broken. And 
though appeals could be made to the chancellor, parliament or king, if one party 
appealed successfully, the other generally objected. Consequently, ‘where litigation, 
lordship, private treaty, or public authority failed, it was likely that one of the parties 
would resort to force’.104 As elsewhere, that meant honourable use of arms in defence 
of family interests – feuding – which was unlikely to be punished heavily. Inter-family 
feuds often escalated into local power-struggles, pulling in rival magnates – which 
could exacerbate the situation, necessitating crown intervention. However, if one side 
in a conflict was well placed at the royal court or had powerful friends there, crown 
intervention might not be neutral. The interaction of local and national politics, 
therefore, could be destabilising: for several historians, indeed, local feuding was a 
major causal factor in the mid fifteenth-century ‘Wars of the Roses’.105 
 This is not unlike Brunner’s, Kaminsky’s, and especially Zmora’s worlds – though 




  Kaminsky, ‘Noble feud’, 74–9; though English disputes, like French, do not fit all the Brunner/Kaminsky 
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100
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1999), and Ralph A. Griffiths, The Reign of King Henry VI (2nd edn., Stroud, 2004), chapters 7, 20, 
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rest of this paragraph derives. The best account of the criminal justice system is Edward Powell, King-
ship, Law, and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V (Oxford, 1989), 23–114; see also 
Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order, 151–60, 174–83, 260–7, and Bellamy, Criminal Law, 54–89. 
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was a public nuisance’: M. T. Clanchy, ‘Law, government and society in medieval England’, History 59 
(1974), 73–8, at p. 78. 
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Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West (Cambridge, 1983), 47–68, refined 
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too little. The best solution was direct royal action – very direct, believed the author of 
a story about Henry V (1413–22) in the Brut chronicle. A Lancashire and a Yorkshire 
knight were feuding, and some of their followers were killed. Henry summoned them, 
and asked on what authority they had made his lieges kill each other. They begged for 
mercy, whereupon Henry said he had some oysters to eat, and unless they had made 
peace before he finished, they would be hanged!106 They did, of course. The story – 
presumably written later, when feuding was rife – portrayed Henry as the great upholder 
of justice. Yet the letter of the law was not followed: despite the killings, he pardoned 
the offenders – but terrified them into not offending again. Edward Powell has 
illustrated the reality of such flexibility. Under Henry IV (1399–1413) the midlands had 
suffered from serious disorder and feuding; so in 1414 Henry V sent King’s Bench  
judges there on ‘superior eyre’. Some 2,200 persons were indicted for violence, and 
about 800 stood trial (the rest would have been outlawed). But few were found guilty; 
most either paid a fine in advance or bought a pardon, and Henry soon pardoned 
everyone who had been indicted. That looks like serious weakness in one of medieval 
England’s toughest kings – yet, as Powell asks, what else could be done? Those indicted 
included most of the county elites; had they been imprisoned or executed, local 
government would have collapsed.107 On the other hand, ‘the most serious offenders 
were made to take out recognisances for large sums to keep the peace; for the rest a 
fine or pardon was sufficient to buy off the king’s suit and gain readmission to his 
peace’.108 Those readmitted to the king’s peace would have known that reoffending 
would not be tolerated – surely the Brut’s main message. 
 Henry V’s strong personal kingship evaporated under Henry VI (1422–61), and 
though Edward IV (1461–83) was tougher, his real heir in this respect was Henry VII 
(1485–1509). Had the oysters story been written about him, the knights would have 
been put under recognisance, promising in writing to pay a large sum of money if they 
offended again. All fifteenth-century kings used recognisances to a certain extent, but 
Henry VII made them ‘the linchpin of his entire ruling system’;109 hundreds were exacted 
from men engaging in violent disputes, generally after appearing before Henry himself 
or his council. That bypassed the formal, clogged-up, law-courts – but in practice was 
the best way of dealing with troublesome gentry and lords.110 
 Thus the response to feuding by the two most successful fifteenth-century English 
kings paralleled French rather than German practice. Also, the numerous pardons 
 
106
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recorded in the patent rolls of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England suggest that 
royal grace was exercised as frequently as in France;111 while English letters of pardon 
had to be ‘proved’ in court, when ‘any appellant wishing to bring a suit against the 
recipient of the pardon’ was entitled to object.112 However, as the word ‘appellant’ 
indicates, a simple objection was not enough; it had to be made through a legal ‘appeal 
of felony’ – a formal private prosecution – which could win damages, but might be 
both costly and unsuccessful.113 That was obviously much less satisfactory for injured 
parties than the French system, in which remissions were almost always conditional 
upon their satisfaction. The reason was, of course, the great development of twelfth- 
and especially thirteenth-century English royal justice114 – as a result of which, F. W. 
Maitland remarked many years ago, ‘the law of wer [wergeld], being no longer 
applicable if there was felony, perished for lack of sustenance, and the parentes occisi 
[kinsmen of the slain] were reduced to getting what they could by threats of an 
appeal’.115 
 Wergeld, indeed, had become ‘anathema to English common law’ – as Rees Davies 
commented in regard to Edward I’s abolition of the Welsh version, galanas, after 
conquering the principality of Wales in 1284.116 But it must be added that outside the 
principality, in the Welsh Marches, galanas appears to have survived into the fifteenth 
century. Moreover, across the Irish Sea the similar éraic operated within Gaelic 
lordships well beyond the Middle Ages,117 while blood-money is found in Anglo-Irish 
lordships as well.118 Ireland leads us back to Scotland, where the eleventh-century 
‘Laws of the Brets and the Scots’ (so-called) detailed the equivalent, cró119 – which, as 
Wormald showed, survived loosely as late medieval and early modern ‘assythment’.120 
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which starts in the 1450s and uses Gluckman’s ‘Peace in the feud’. See also Katherine Simms, From Kings 
to Warlords: The Changing Political Structure of Gaelic Ireland in the Later Middle Ages (Wood-
bridge, 1987), 89–91; K. W. Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages (2nd edn., 
Dublin, 2003), 59–64; and Fergus Kelly, A Guide to Early Irish Law (Dublin, 1988), 125–34. 
118
  Peter Crooks, ‘Factions, feuds and noble power in the lordship of Ireland, c.1356–1496’, Irish Histori-
cal Studies 35 (2007), 425–54, esp. p. 453; Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland, 60–4. 
119
  Alice Taylor, ‘Leges Scocie and the lawcodes of David I, William the Lion and Alexander III’, SHR 88 
(2009), 207–88, at pp. 237–43, and (for text and translation) 278–9, 286–8; Patrick Wormald, 
‘Anglo-Saxon law and Scots law’, SHR 88 (2009), 192–206. 
120
  Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 62–4. It was still paid in the eighteenth century, and was not formally abolished 
until 1996: W. David H. Sellar, ‘Forethocht felony, malice aforethought and the classification of homi-
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 And with respect to Scotland, whereas when ‘Bloodfeud’ was published it seemed 
exceptional, it now appears to be entirely normal. What are the general implications? 
Though Max Weber’s concept of the modern state’s ‘monopoly of legitimate force’ is 
conspicuously absent,121 the underlying concept – that the state’s purpose is to uphold 
law and order – applies usefully to the medieval era. But what law was upheld? It 
involved not only enactments (‘statute law’), but also traditional rules which tolerated 
the commonest forms of killing (in hot-blooded quarrel and self-defence) and required 
compensation for the victim’s kin. And how was ‘order’ maintained? The main need 
was to prevent prolonged feuding, which was more achievable through pacification 
than punishment, since the latter could stimulate more feud. Pardons and blood-
money were therefore crucial for medieval law-and-order mechanisms. Admittedly 
these varied – the ‘state’ is less visible in Germany, while in England, where it is most 
visible, the compensation requirement disappeared. As for Scotland, its system 
resembles France’s – and both seem good examples of the late medieval approach to 
maintaining law and order, which evokes not Weber’s monopoly of force but Michel 
Foucault’s contention that sovereignty’s fundamental attribute was the right ‘to take 
life or let live’.122 The life-giving pardon can be called the ultimate act of state. 
II 
The rest of my reflections are specifically Scottish, and focus on royal remissions. 
Technically, these relate to crime rather than feuding, which, as the 1598 act anent 
feud shows, was not crime per se.123 But what was medieval crime? For Scotland, Alice 
Taylor answers significantly, ‘we cannot continue identifying crime by the presence of 
royal or … state punishment. Crime should instead be understood to denote offences 
that an authority put right, through the force of its own law-making’.124 Saudi Arabia, 
where the state plays a largely enabling role, comes to mind.125 But from the later twelfth 
century the Scottish crown claimed more. A charter of William I asserted that major 
offences – ‘murder, premeditated assault, rape, arson and plunder’ – belonged ‘to my 
regality’ and should be prosecuted by his ‘crowner’ before his justices; while his laws 
forbade lords from holding courts without notifying the sheriffs, and reserved the ‘four 
–––––––––––––– 
cide’, in W. M. Gordon and T. D. Fergus (eds.), Legal History in the Making (London, 1991), 43–59, at 
p. 47. 
121
  Weber: Political Writings, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers (Cambridge, 1994), 310–11. 
122
  Michel Foucault, ‘Society must be defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76, trans. David 
Macey (London, 2003), 240–1. See also Gauvard, ‘Grâce et exécution capitale’, 290: ‘The judicial 
power of the king thus has a double nature: it is simultaneously a power of life and a power of death’. 
123
  RPS, 1598/6/2: it was intended to pacify feuds through compulsory royal arbitration, and also enable 
those against whom ‘deadly crimes’ had been committed in the course of the feuds to make formal 
accusations. 
124
  Alice Taylor, ‘Crime without punishment: Medieval Scottish law in comparative perspective’, in David 
Bates (ed.), Anglo-Norman Studies, XXXV: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2012 (Woodbridge, 
2013), 287–304; quotation from p. 304; I am most grateful to Dr Taylor for sending me a pre-
publication copy. 
125
  Above, at note 25. 
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pleas … pertaining to his crown: namely rape, plunder, arson and murder’.126 
Furthermore, the thirteenth-century ‘legislation of Alexander II reveals a royal monopoly 
over crime’ – which has obvious implications for the granting of remissions.127 
 Such a monopoly was never absolute, however, because (as in France) the rights of 
the victim of crime or his kin remained fundamental. Consequently, Scottish remis-
sions, like French (and as in shari‘a law), were always conditional on the offender 
giving assythment. That is clear from the first known text of a remission for killing, in 
an early fourteenth-century formulary: 
[the king] remits our rancour against T de C for the death of X, provided that 
he makes peace with the relatives and friends of X so that we hear no further 
complaint; takes him under our peace; and forbids anyone to hurt him on 
account of the death of X under pain of forfeiture, or to kill him under pain of 
death.128 
An actual early fifteenth-century remission is similar but fuller: 
Remission by Robert, Duke of Albany, Governor of Scotland, to Thomas Boyd 
of Kilmarnock, Robert Muir of Rowallan, etc., for the slaughter of Maurice 
Neilson of Dalrymple, Robert Black and Donald Young at Dalmellington, for 
burning their houses, for ravaging the goods and chattels of Alexander 
Cunningham at Badlane, and the lands of Drumcross, and for all other depre-
dations. Provided that Thomas etc. make such peace and concord with the kin 
and friends of the late Maurice etc., and give such compensation for all dam-
ages, that henceforth no complaint shall be heard about this matter. Also, 
Thomas etc. are taken firmly into the Governor’s peace: they are not to be 
attacked, under threat of royal forfeiture. 24 October 1409.129 
Unfortunately Scottish remissions, unlike French, did not rehearse offenders’ stories; 
but their principle was the same. So was the procedure, which (at least from the later 
fifteenth century) involved obtaining a royal letter that was either effective immedi-
ately, or was examined in court (usually under challenge), and if acceptable was then 
put into operation; but both processes depended on the opposing party issuing a ‘letter 
of slains’ certifying due satisfaction.130 In Scotland as in France, however, remissions 
 
126
  RRS, ii, no. 80; Taylor, ‘Leges Scocie’, 211, 282–3 (LS, c.7). 
127
  Quotation fromTaylor, ‘Crime without punishment’, 304; and for the implications, Cynthia J. Neville, 
‘Royal mercy in later medieval Scotland’, Florilegium, forthcoming. I am most grateful to Professor 
Neville for sending me a final draft of this article, which introduces her current research project on the 
subject. 
128
  Scottish Formularies, ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Stair Society, 2011), E44, giving the text of either A39 or 
A40 (p. 21), which are early fourteenth-century; Duncan’s summary, slightly amended. 
129
  NRS, Boyd of Kilmarnock Papers, GD8/1; my summary. 
130
  This derives mostly from Jackson W. Armstrong, ‘The justice ayre in the Border sheriffdoms, 1493–
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were strongly criticised, as in the later-fifteenth-century poem on kingship known as 
‘The Harp’: 
 But of one thing all good men marvel more 
 When great council, with thine own consent 
 Has ordained strict justice no man to spare 
 Within short time thou changes thine intent 
 Sending a contrair letter incontinent 
 Charging of that matter may be naught 
 Then all the world murmurs thou art bought 
 … 
 And when thou gives a plain remission 
 In case requiring rigour of justice 
 But [without] goodly cause, thou offends to the crown 
 And forfeits both to God and thine office.131 
Historians have mostly echoed such criticism, but detailed analysis gives a more 
complex picture. 
 The first reference to remissions is in the Assise Willelmi Regis: if a thief was 
lawfully executed and his kin killed his accuser, ‘the king shall have his full right from 
the killers’ – ‘without any concord or remission unless by the advice and consent of 
[the victim’s] kin’; and if he granted remission without their knowledge, they ‘may take 
vengeance on those who killed their kinsman’. But only the first part (to the dash) is 
William I’s; the rest is a late thirteenth- or early fourteenth-century amendment.132 
That shows the emergence of remissions, and highlights the necessity for consent by 
the victim’s kin and the legitimacy of vengeance killing – though perhaps only in this 
special case. 
 Formal parliamentary records begin with Robert I’s legislation of 1318, which has 
three relevant chapters. Because of past ‘disagreements and grievances … between the 
nobles’, c.22 forbade ‘that henceforth any person cause damage, burden or harm to 
another’, and anyone doing so shall have ‘broken the peace of the lord king’,133 which 
looks like a (highly optimistic) ban on feuding. Also, c.5 enacted that when anyone was 
convicted ‘of homicide, rapine, theft or other offences … common justice be done 
–––––––––––––– 
1498’, SHR 92 (2013), 1–37, at pp. 30–3; and for slains, see Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 62–3, 66. 
131
  Liber Pluscardensis, 2 vols., ed. F. J. H. Skene (Edinburgh, 1877–80), i, 399–400. This chronicle was 
written in the early 1460s, but survives only in copies from 1478×1496 and (apparently) 1489. The 
poem – the last item in the chronicle – is in only the 1489 version (ibid., i, pp. x–xii), and so may well 
be an addition to the text proper. Therefore it is more likely to be aimed at James III (whom the criti-
cism fits exactly, see below, at note 145) than James II, as is usually said, e.g. by Roland Tanner, The 
Late Medieval Scottish Parliament: Politics and the Three Estates, 1424–1488 (East Linton, 2001), 
162. 
132
  Taylor, ‘Leges Scocie’, 232–4. 
133
  RPS, 1318/22. 
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without redemption’, and c.11 that ‘no-one [shall] take a redemption from a thief’– but 
neither provision applied to the king or to lords possessing ‘liberties in such matters’.134 
So lords of regality could grant remissions; but who else had been doing so, wrong-
fully? Perhaps earls – which would have important implications – but we cannot say. 
However, crown authority over remissions was now asserted. 
 Next, after David II came back from captivity in 1357, his ‘full council’ declared 
‘that nobody in future shall move war against his neighbours’ (again anti-feud), and 
that the king would review past remissions by his lieutenant.135 However, royal 
impartiality became an issue: in 1366 ‘the three communities’ insisted that justice 
should be done without favour, that judicial letters should not be revoked (as later in 
‘The Harp’), and that ‘remissions … should be null and void’ unless compensation was 
accepted within a year.136 And in 1370, David had to prohibit remissions for homicides 
found by inquest to be by ‘murder or malice aforethought’ unless the general council 
gave approval; though he could still grant them for unpremeditated killing.137 Theoreti-
cally, that was a significant change. For William I, ‘murder and premeditated assault’ 
pertained ‘to my regality’, and so, by Robert I’s logic, the crown could grant remissions 
for them; but parliament was now attempting to restrict that regality. 
 After Robert II succeeded David, the 1372 parliament developed the new rules, 
allegedly because of recent killings. Since justice ‘was not as fast as expedient’, in future  
a killer should be imprisoned while an immediate assize determined whether the 
homicide was ‘by forethought felony or murder, or from the heat of anger, namely 
chaudemella’. If the former, ‘justice is immediately to be done’; if the latter, ‘he will 
have the legitimate and due delays and defences’.138 Those who committed murder or 
forethought killing were now to be executed at once! The new rules were draconian – 
but exceptional, because they were to apply for just three years. And 1384 saw further 
law-and-order legislation. Unfortunately the homicide measures (again for three years) 
are lost; but the concept of forethought malice (precognita malicia) was extended to 
mutilation, wounding and beating.139 The next recorded legislation was under Robert 
 
134
  RPS, 1318/5, 11. Note Scottish Formularies, E49 (pp. 74–5): a brieve by which the king ‘following his 
statute issued dealing with such a case, remits his rancour’ for a killing found by inquest to be in self-
defence. This, pace Duncan, can be associated with the 1318 legislation, c.5. 
135
  RPS, 1357/11/12–13. 
136
  Ibid., 1366/7/6, 13, my paraphrase of some problematic wording, which may have been mistran-
scribed: ‘remissions should be null and void, nec satifiat parti infra annum a data earundem, nisi 
forte manifeste steterit per illos quorum interest’. 
137
  Ibid., 1370/2/36: per murthyr vel per precogitatam maliciam. See also 1370/2/12, and Scottish 
Formularies, E14 (pp. 55–6): a ‘brieve to the sheriff to hold an inquest into whether the bearer killed 
someone in a rage and not by murder or forethought felony’; this probably dates from the early 1370s, 
and certainly from before 1424. 
138
  RPS, 1372/3/6, and 7–12; Sellar, ‘Forethocht felony’, 48–9. 
139
  RPS, 1384/11/1, 6–17. A whole folio is clearly missing between the preamble to c.6, and the middle  
of what is called c.7: see notes to c.6 and c.7. The time limit is stated in c.17, while c.9 deals with mutila-
tion and wounding by forethought, for which the process should proceed ‘as is ordained above 
concerning homicide’. Much of Robert II’s and Robert III’s parliamentary records are missing, and 
what survives is mostly in problematic copies: ibid., 1384/1/1, note. 
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III: the 1397 ‘statute of Stirling’ addressing ‘great and horrible destructions … and 
slaughters’. No one was to ‘use destructions, slaughter, reif nor burning … under the 
pain of forfeiture of life and goods’, and for three years offenders identified by inquest 
had to give securities to appear at the next justice ayre; those who could not would be 
executed, and those who fled would be put ‘to the horn [outlawed] without remis-
sion’.140 The following year, ‘to repress transgressors more sternly’, all offenders were 
given just forty days ‘to stand to law’, or be outlawed;141 while in 1399, a further amend-
ment put victims’ complaints to royal officers on the same footing as formal inquests, 
and the statute was extended for three more years.142 
 The later fourteenth-century acts demonstrate serious concern about law and 
order, echoing English and French measures.143 But they also demonstrate consistent, 
thoughtful efforts by the political elite to make the system more effective, including 
(ideally) limiting remissions to unpremeditated offences. That, however (as noted 
above), restricted royal power and grace, and so had to be convincingly justified: hence 
the preambles highlighting awful lawlessness, which (as with modern equivalents) can 
be regarded as political propaganda depicting a collapse of law and order which had to 
be rectified.144 
 The most famous instance of such propaganda is, of course, Bower’s story of  
James I being told on his return to Scotland in 1424 about the ‘thieving, dishonest 
conduct and plundering’ in Scotland, and replying, ‘If God spares me I shall see to it 
that the key guards the castle and the thorn bushes the cow’.145 His first enactment in 
1424 was ‘that firm and secure peace be … held among all and sundry lieges and 
subjects of our sovereign lord the king. And that no man … move or make war against 
another, under all pain that may follow by the course of common law’.146 That is 
nothing new, and in practice his only important innovation was to make his predeces-
sors’ three-year provisions permanent. But the lives of those guilty of forethought 
homicide were to be ‘at the king’s will’, so remissions were not forbidden: James had 
cancelled the 1370s restriction on royal grace.147 His other acts simply modified the 
1370–99 measures,148 and minor amendments are all that can be found under his 
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  Ibid., 1397/1–2. 
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  Ibid., 1398/9. 
142
  Ibid., 1399/1/14. 
143
  For these, see Sellar, ‘Forethocht felony’, 46–6, 51–2. 
144
  For an in-depth analysis of political propaganda relating to crime which is relevant here, see Claude 
Gauvard, ‘Fear of crime in late medieval France’, in Barbara A. Hanawalt and David Wallace (eds.), 
Medieval Crime and Social Control (Minneapolis, Minn., 1999), 1–48: a translation of ‘De grâce 
especial’, chapter 5. 
145
  Chron. Bower (Watt), viii, 323. This theme is excellently explored in Michael Brown, ‘James I’, in 
Michael Brown and Roland Tanner (eds.), Scottish Kingship, 1306–1542: Essays in Honour of Norman 
Macdougall (Edinburgh, 2008), 155–78, at pp. 157–64, and p. 175 for how James’s harsh administra-
tion of government, especially justice, backfired fatally in 1437. 
146
  RPS, 1424/2a. 
147
  Ibid., 1426/10. 
148
  Compare RPS, 1424/5 with 1397/1; 1425/3/15 with 1397/2; 1426/10 with 1372/3/6, 1398/9, and 
1399/1/4; 1432/3/2 with 1372/3/6; and 1432/3/6–7 with 1398/10. 
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successors.149 But in 1473 parliament exhorted James III ‘to close his hands for  
remissions and respites’;150 in 1477, because ‘the greatest reason’ for the frequency of 
slaughter ‘is the easy granting of the king’s grace in pardons’, forgiveness ‘for any kind 
of slaughter’ was suspended for the next three years;151 and there were three similar 
acts in 1484, 1485 and 1487.152 This is worse than the pressure on David II, and surely 
reflects a specific problem with James III (as probably reflected in ‘The Harp’) – which 
he may have justified in terms of royal power to ‘let live’ through acts of mercy.153 
 In contrast, under James IV – who has the best law-and-order reputation of any 
late medieval Scottish king – the legislation has no mention of (and hence concern 
about) remissions until 1504, when, because of ‘great slaughter … and the reasons for it 
in the assurance and belief of getting swift remissions’, he agreed to prohibit them ‘for 
slaughter committed as premeditated felony’ until decided otherwise.154 This parlia-
ment, however, was held in response to specific defiance from parts of the Highlands 
and the West, and both the preamble and the act (with its ban on mercy for deliberate 
killing) can be seen as political statements. That said, the act – which echoes criticisms 
of his father – has been seen as complaining about James using remissions to raise 
money.155 These were certainly lucrative: for instance in 1495 Hugh Rose of Kilravock 
and William Munro of Foulis (plus accomplices) paid £233.6s.8d. and £80 respectively 
for remissions for killing Walter Gawane.156 But so long as the crown ensured that 
remissions did bring assythment and pacification (which James III probably did not 
do), then to view them chiefly from a fiscal standpoint is distorting. As with early 
medieval wergeld or cró and modern fines, the exaction of money was primarily 
punitive; royal remissions for serious crimes were not cheap, while the victim’s kin had 
to be compensated, too. 
 More significantly, the act banned only remissions for homicide by forethought. 
The preamble suggests such killings were widespread, but is that correct? For James 
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  Ibid., 1469/25; 1471/5/3; 1484/2/33; 1485/5/10; 1487/10/8–9; 1488/1/22. 
150
  Ibid., 1473/7/10. A respite was a conditional remission, limited to a number of years.  
151
  Ibid., 1478/6/80: discussed (and redated) in Tanner, Late Medieval Scottish Parliament, 214–15, 
along with a 1477 privy seal letter to the sheriff of Edinburgh ordering public proclamation that there 
would be no ‘respite or remission for slaughter committed of forethought felony’ – a narrower 
definition than in the statute. 
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  RPS, 1484/2/34; 1485/5/10; 1487/10/5. 
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  Tanner, Late Medieval Scottish Parliament, 215, 251, 254–6; Norman Macdougall, James III (2nd 
edn., Edinburgh, 2009), 141–2, and p. 274 for the story of how James, accompanied by the papal legate 
and Bishop Elphinstone, pardoned a condemned aristocratic murderer with the words ‘let mercy  
prevail’ – to Elphinstone’s approval. This apocryphal story may have been aimed against parliament’s 
disapproval of James’s remissions. For more on the story, see Alasdair A. MacDonald, ‘James III, king-
ship and contested reputation’, Chapter 11 in this volume. 
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  RPS, 1504/3/108; also, more briefly, 1504/3/25. 
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  E.g. by Norman Macdougall, James IV (Edinburgh, 1989), 164; Ranald Nicholson, Scotland: The Later 
Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1974), 570. 
156
  TA, i, 210. Two years later Rose received a remission for himself and eleven others, for the cruel killing 
of Gawane and three others in the chanonry at Fortrose: RSS, i, no. 166. It is unclear whether this was 
linked to the 1495 payment, or whether there was a new transaction because of the other three mortal-
ities. 
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IV, the Privy Seal Register survives, and so all the registered remissions that were 
formally registered can be studied – though here only a brief analysis is possible. In all, 
581 remissions and temporary respites were registered. The breakdown of the most 
serious offence mentioned in each of them is: 249 remissions or respites for homicide; 
ninety-seven for forethought felony; 114 for defying the crown (mostly by rebelling, 
helping rebels and outlaws, refusing to serve in the army, and abusing sheriffs); fifty-
four for reif or robbery (mostly of livestock); forty for arson, plunder and other 
‘oppression’ (damage to property); five for rape; fourteen for theft; and eight for ‘theft-
wise’ damaging the goods of the victim when lying with his wife (which must have 
meant stealing or damaging the husband’s sexual rights over his wife, thus making 
adultery criminal and entitling the husband to assythment). All the offences except 
theft and adultery usually involved violence and could be associated with feud, but 
here my focus is on homicide and forethought felony.157 
 It should be noted, however, that ‘forethought felony’ per se did not automatically 
indicate killing: its general usage shows it was a wider concept, applicable to any pre-
meditated violence. That is demonstrated by the remission granted to Andrew, Thomas 
and John Hunter in September 1498, ‘for the slaughter of the late (umquhile) Thomas 
Blackford, and for the forethought felony done upon the said Thomas, his wife, bairns 
and servants’:158 clearly Thomas, his wife, children and servants had suffered a premedi-
tated attack, but only Thomas had been killed, perhaps by accident. More generally, 
when a person is said to have been killed, they are invariably described as ‘late’, which 
is never found in forethought remissions unless a killing is also recorded; and whereas 
with remissions for homicide all other offences are normally included as well, with 
remissions for forethought offences that are not said to involve a killing, homicide is 
always specifically excluded.159  
 As for the 249 instances of actual homicide, remarkably few killings are said to be 
for forethought: only nine before the 1504 act, one in 1507 and two in 1510–11.160 There 
were fifteen remissions for ‘cruel homicide’, presumably horrific or excessive wound-
ing;161 and twenty-eight for homicide ‘by suddenty’ or the like, in most cases no doubt 
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  Found within RSS, i, pp. 1–386; counting only the most serious offences recorded in each remission or 
respite (note that a single offence could generate several remissions, if several individuals were 
involved). Because of this methodology, my figures differ from those given in Nicholson, Scotland, 569, 
Macdougall, James IV, 164, and Leslie J. Macfarlane, William Elphinstone and the Kingdom of Scot-
land, 1413–1514 (Aberdeen, 1985), 411–12, 436 (in which, incidentally, reif and theft seem to have been 
merged). A full-scale analysis of the material is planned by Cynthia Neville; see above, note 127. 
158
  RSS, i, no. 251. 
159
  Nicholson, Macdougall and Macfarlane do not mention this important point with respect to their 
remission analyses. But, more significantly, Armstrong, ‘Justice ayre’, 26–9, counts all mentions of 
forethought felony as homicide, which, unfortunately, seriously distorts that part of his analysis and 
argument. For the 1384 legislation, RPS, 1384/11/9, and above, at note 139. 
160
  RSS, i, nos. 16, 106, 109, 163, 251, 307, 412, 690, 825, 1410, 1991, 2193. The 1504 act was probably 
cancelled in the 1509 parliament, but most of its legislation is lost: Macdougall, James IV, 190–1. 
161
  RSS, i, nos. 117, 127, 166, 412, 584, 676, 718–20, 918, 1410, 1572, 1980, 2204, 2259. 
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due to outbursts of rage162 – as with John Thowles’s remission for killing Alexander 
Meill ‘suddenly with a blow from a staff, namely a golf club’.163 However, the form of 
homicide is not categorised in the other 194 instances. Some, like the killing of a child 
‘by the cast of a stone at a dog’,164 would have been accidental. But a broader explanation 
can be suggested. Since the 1370s there had been formal inquests into whether X killed 
Y ‘by forethought felony or not’.165 Any homicides not clearly caused by accident or 
rage should have been investigated, and those which inquests found not to be by 
forethought were probably recorded simply as homicide,166 with no qualification 
(including many cases of self-defence, which the remissions never mention). In addition, 
the well-known propensity of medieval juries to favour the defendant would also help 
to explain why forethought verdicts were so scarce.167 
 Furthermore, it was probably easy and safe to commit non-forethought homicide 
deliberately. Consider late medieval Scotland’s two most notorious killings. When 
James II summoned the eighth earl of Douglas to Stirling in February 1452, did 
he seriously expect him to break the Douglas–Crawford–Ross bond? According to 
the ‘Auchinleck Chronicle’, when Douglas said (probably vehemently and certainly 
insultingly) ‘he might not nor would not’, James called him ‘false traitor’ and ‘leapt  
suddenly to him with a knife’. James must have expected that outcome – but technically 
it was excusable homicide ‘by suddenty’, though Douglas’s brother understandably 
called it foul slaughter.168 Similarly, when in February 1306 Robert Bruce set out for his 
fateful meeting with John Comyn in the Greyfriars church, Dumfries, did he seriously 
believe that they would reach an amicable agreement? I think not, and suggest that he 
anticipated and quite probably engineered a hot-blooded quarrel in which Comyn could 
be killed without overt premeditation.169 Irrespective of whether that is correct in these 
cases, the main point is that by creating a situation in which a hot-blooded quarrel was 
inevitable, an enemy could be killed without committing forethought felony. 
 Also, when rival lords’ followings encountered each other, tensions could easily 
escalate into lethal violence, as Romeo and Juliet illustrates, and as at Monzievaird in 
1489, when a long-running quarrel flared up and led to Drummonds setting the local 
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  Ibid., nos. 66, 288, 325, 421, 489, 522, 610, 679, 680, 696, 764, 803, 840, 929, 1123, 1181, 1296, 1547, 
1581, 1595, 1617, 1697, 1726, 1746, 1802, 1992, 2004, 2194 (including a few deaths caused by ‘negligence’). 
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  ‘… pro interfectione quondam Alexandri Meill ex subito per ictum baculi, viz golf club, commissa’: 
ibid., no. 1547. 
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  Ibid., no. 83. 
165
  Above, at note 137. 
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  I.e. the ‘simple homicide’ of Regiam Majestatem: below, at note 179. 
167
  Also, in 18 instances remissions were granted to men who had been ‘put to the horn’ or had fled to 
England, in which case formal inquests were presumably unnecessary: RSS, i, nos. 37, 69, 86, 90, 104, 
108, 110, 113, 117, 375, 665, 696, 1301, 1331, 1361, 1414, 1578, 1597. 
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  Christine McGladdery, James II (Edinburgh, 1990), 165; now best discussed in Christine McGladdery, 
‘James II (1437–1460)’, in Brown and Tanner (eds.), Scottish Kingship, 179–208, at pp. 191–5. How-
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church on fire with twenty Murrays inside. On the other hand, with this atrocity pow-
erful state action was taken, not so much by the young James IV as by his council.170 
That illustrates the same collective desire to maintain order as in the parliamentary 
legislation: the collective-versus-individual pressures promoting ‘peace in the feud’ 
were operating within ‘the justice of the state’. And eleven years later, ‘for heartliness … 
amongst them’, the Drummond and Murray lords received royal letters ‘remitting to 
their kin and friends … all actions and crimes of the burning of the kirk of Monzievaird 
and slaughter of the king’s lieges’.171 Pacification of feud was always the ideal, and from 
the crown’s standpoint the remission system was as important for achieving it as the 
formal ‘justice of the state’. 
 That said, aristocratic feuding is not very visible in the privy seal register. Only 
twenty-four remissions or respites for homicide went to certain or probable members 
of the landed classes. Cuthbert Cunningham, earl of Glencairn is the greatest, but his 
remissions in 1508 for non-lethal forethought violence and in 1511 for killing Andrew 
McFarlane in Bute are not obviously connected to his long-running feud with the earl 
of Eglinton.172 Other leading figures who had homicide remissions or respites included 
William Gordon son of the earl of Huntly,  Archibald Ogilvie son of Lord Airlie, David 
Hume of Wedderburn, Hugh Rose of Kilravock, Patrick Dunbar son of the lord of 
Kilconquhar, William son of Matthew Wallace of Craigie, and Andrew Blackadder of 
that ilk, who killed two men and wounded three ‘near the king’s palace while the king 
was in residence’.173 But the list is short, and most of the other twenty-four are only 
minor lairds. 
 Twenty-four is just under a tenth of the total: higher, surely, than the landed 
classes’ share of the population, but roughly the same proportion as Gauvard found in 
France.174 Also, hardly anyone received remissions for more than one killing, and there 
is only one instance (discussed below) of a killer being killed himself.175 The James IV 
remissions and respites, in other words, give virtually no evidence of the chains of tit-
for-tat homicide that are usually associated with feuds. That may simply be a function 
of the way the documents were written; had they included the killers’ narratives, the 
conclusion might be different. But the absence of tit-for-tat killing is also a feature 
(though not quite so extreme) of the French remissions. As said already, Gauvard 
attributed that to a crown policy of accepting that it could not prevent fatal quarrels 
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from breaking out in all ranks of society – but that it could, through giving letters of 
remission to the killers so long as the victims’ families were compensated, significantly 
reduce the likelihood of long-term feud, such as is found in Albania.176 The evidence of 
the Scottish remissions in James IV’s privy seal register, although a much smaller 
sample, indicates exactly the same conclusion – which puts Scotland beside France on 
Wormald’s spectrum. Killing in quarrels was part of human nature, and late medieval 
Scotland’s state machinery could not prevent it; but in normal circumstances it could 
stifle most potential feuds, and limit the duration of those that did break out. It did so, 
essentially, through the use of remissions – which could be described as harnessing the 
justice of the feud to serve the justice of the state. 
III 
However, there is a final point. Nowadays, under Scots law, all the forethought killings 
and many of the others would be murder.177 One of James IV’s remissions and respites 
for forethought killing is actually for murder: ‘A respite to Patrick McCulloch, for … the 
murder and slaughter of the late Archibald McCulloch of Ardwell, committed … upon 
forethought felony, under silence of night’.178 The ‘silence of night’ makes it different, 
in accordance with the definitions in late medieval Scotland’s main legal text, Regiam 
Majestatem: ‘There are two kinds of homicide. The first is murder, which is homicide 
secretly perpetrated without the knowledge of anyone except the assailant and his 
accomplices … The second kind of homicide is called simple homicide’.179 Thus secrecy 
is the issue – which includes killing at night. 
 That is not just Scottish: ‘as is well known, the word “murder” is cognate with 
Germanic “mord” and Scandinavian “morð” signifying a secret killing’.180 Regiam 
Majestatem was copying the twelfth-century English text, ‘Glanvill’,181 while Philippe 
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de Beaumanoir’s later thirteenth-century Coutumes state that ‘murder is when anyone 
kills anyone else or has them killed by premeditation between sunset and sunrise, or 
under truce or assurance’. All three contrast murder and homicide; but with Regiam 
and ‘Glanvill’ the distinction is obviously between secret and open killing; while for 
Beaumanoir homicide is simply killing in hot blood (chaude mellee), which blurs the 
issue.182 But by Beaumanoir’s time, ‘premeditated malice’ and ‘wrath’ were being 
distinguished in England, too, and in the fourteenth century premeditation eventually 
came into a statute of 1390 forbidding pardons ‘for murder [and] homicide occasioned 
by … malice aforethought’.183 Similarly but earlier, a French ordinance of 1356 banned 
royal remissions for ‘murders and mutilations made by premeditation and evil will’.184 
These straddle the Scottish acts of 1370 and 1372, which also restricted remissions, and 
made a distinction between murder and forethought felony on the one hand and 
(echoing Beaumanoir) chaudmella or hot-blooded killing on the other.185 Legal minds 
in all three countries were working in the same direction. 
 In fifteenth-century France and England, however, murder became more 
general, encompassing premeditated killing just as nowadays.186 Scottish fifteenth-
century legislation shows a similar blurring, but in the opposite direction: from James I 
on, the acts mention only ‘forethought felony’ and ‘sudden chaudmella’, dropping 
murder. That might support Sellar’s argument about murder being incorporated 
within forethought felony in the 1370s – and it could be regarded as a sub-category of 
the latter in Patrick McCulloch’s respite. On the other hand, as we have seen, fore-
thought felony covered more than killing, while murder was still distinct from 
slaughter because it was committed at night. Moreover, the Border ayres studied by 
Armstrong had a case of ‘forethought felony by means of murder’ and another of 
‘murder [and] killing’ – ‘both suggestive of secret killing, one with premeditation, the 
other without’.187 Thus I would argue that in Scotland the concept of murder retained 
its special restricted meaning at least until the end of the fifteenth century – and 
perhaps beyond, given the definition in Skene’s De Verborum Significatione of 1597: 
MURTHURUM, whereof of some is called private, that is manslaughter, 
whereof the author is unknown, whereof the inquisition belongs to the crowner; 
as where a person is found slain, or drowned, in any place or water. Other is 
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public committed by forethought felony. And murder is committed by fore-
thought felony and not by suddenty.188 
Skene was following Regiam Majestatem, but glossing it for his own time; and while 
murder comes under forethought felony, it is still non-public, with unknown perpe-
trators – in other words secret. 
 In a sense, that concept of murder survives today, in crime fiction: there would 
be no detective novels if all killings were public! Not knowing ‘whodunnit’, was, of 
course, crucial in the worst of Scotland’s political killings, that of Henry Stewart Lord 
Darnley, the king-consort – which was certainly murder. And in ordinary life there 
were no doubt many occasions when a body was found, and the questions had to  
be asked: had the deceased been killed, was the killing deliberate, and who was 
responsible? But in the past, if there was a suspect, one popular solution was the 
process of ‘cruentation’: he was brought before the corpse, which, it was believed, 
would bleed or speak out if touched by its murderer. An echo of this is found in the 
case of Sir James Standsfield, who was found dead, apparently drowned, in winter 
1687–8; because his son would not let the body be viewed, he became suspect, and was 
eventually tried for murder.189 Earlier, the practice had been common in both Britain 
and France:190 so, whatever the legal terminology, ‘secret’ killing was different and 
special. The most famous illustration of that is in Chaucer’s ‘Nun’s Priest’s Tale’: two 
friends stayed in a tavern, and one dreamed that the other was being murdered; next 
morning, when told his friend had left, he remembered the dream and found the body: 
‘murder will out’.191 
 In addition to obvious shock, two factors surely made secret killing so awful. 
First, whereas open revenge killing would be presented and understood in terms of 
honourable reaction to insult or the like, a secret killer was a dishonourable coward. 
And, even worse, his victim’s kin would find it hard to achieve closure through either 
compensation or revenge – and they might even attack the wrong person in trying. 
Consequently, the secret killer was deliberately rejecting his society’s pacification 
mechanisms. Thus when, according to Bower, Roger Kirkpatrick was killed by his guest 
Sir James Lindsay ‘after the wine had been pleasurably drained’, and Lindsay then fled 
on horseback but did not cover more than three miles, we might blame alcohol and 
think that peace could still be made. Instead, Bower relates, David II immediately held 
an assize which put Lindsay to death – as much, it seems, for running away (under 
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cover of night) as for the actual deed, which though presumably hot-blooded was 
turned into murder.192 
 Now, as David II’s role in this case indicates, if secret killing negated feud 
justice, then the justice of the state had to step in – which may be a major reason for 
‘the rise of the state’. But that did not mean the king taking over from the kin. In the 
medieval world’s main model for government, the Old Testament, the Jewish people 
were all descended from Abraham, whose lineage went through King David to Jesus 
Christ. David and his successors were thus heads of the Jewish kindred – as were 
Cerdic and his descendants for the Saxons, and so on. For Alba and Scotland, Dauvit 
Broun and others have shown, ‘the Pictish antecedents of Scottish kingship are … 
proclaimed in the eleventh-century text Lebor Bretnach’, which includes the legend of 
Cruithne (Pict) and his seven sons who took ‘the north of the island of Britain’. Each 
son in turn succeeded Cruithne – and their names correspond to seven provinces, each 
theoretically inhabited by the descendants of one of the sons. The story was probably 
created in the eighth century, and survived into the twelfth and beyond.193 Its message, 
of course, was that all the people of all the provinces of Alba descended from Cruithne – 
so that Cruithne’s successor as king was head of the kin of the whole of Alba and later 
Scotland. Therefore, if the justice of the state was the justice of the king, that made it 
the justice of the overall head of the entire Scottish kindred. And from that conceptual 
standpoint, the king’s justice could not be distinguished from the kin’s justice. My final 
reflection on Wormald’s bloodfeud and the interaction between the justice of the feud 
and the justice of the state, therefore, is that there is no dichotomy between them: they 
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